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On the moral standing of animals in
Tibetan Buddhism
Au sujet du sens moral des animaux dans le bouddhisme tibétain
Geoffrey Barstow
1 Like  other  forms  of  Buddhism,  the  Tibetan  tradition  recognizes  that  animals,  like
humans, are sentient beings capable of emotions and some level of thought. As such,
there  is  no  question  that  animals  are  capable  of  suffering  and  that  humans  should
consider their needs when making ethical decisions. The question I seek to address in this
article, therefore, is not whether Tibetan Buddhism grants animals moral standing at all.
Rather,  as  Bronwyn  Finnigan  has  pointed  out  in  her  recent  analysis  of  Buddhist
approaches  to  animal  ethics,  “The  pertinent  question  […]  concerns  how  much
significance [animals] should have and what this practically entails” (Finnigan 2017, p. 3).
For while the Tibetan tradition is clear that animals are sentient beings, and therefore
share a fundamental similarity with humans, the tradition is also clear that they are less
intelligent and capable than humans. This lack of intelligence means that animals are
assumed  to  be  incapable  of  practising  religion,  meaning  that  they  are  incapable  of
alleviating  their  suffering  on  anything  more  than  a  temporary,  worldly  level.
Nevertheless, despite their stupidity relative to humans, the Tibetan tradition also makes
clear  that  animals  have rich inner lives.  They feel  physical  pain,  of  course,  but  also
emotions such as  fear,  love,  and desire.  As  such,  I  argue that  the Tibetan traditions
suggests that animals experience the world in ways that are fundamentally similar to the
way humans experience the world. Based on this perceived similarity between animal and
human mental lives, I argue, Tibetans consistently accorded animals significant moral
standing. This view of animals’ moral standing is reflected not only in theoretical texts
but also in a wide variety of practices aimed at reducing animal suffering1.
2 This is not a new question in Buddhist studies. For more than a century, scholars have
attempted to understand Buddhism’s approach to animals and humanity’s responsibility
towards them2.  The frequency of these scholarly analyses suggests that Buddhism has
something to offer to contemporary discussions of the status of animals vis-à-vis humans,
potentially as a counter-weight to the Judaeo-Christian tradition that tends to dominate
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these debates3. For the most part, however, these studies of animals and Buddhism focus
on the South Asian Buddhist tradition and often seek to define a pan-Buddhist approach
to  animals.  Fortunately,  this  trend  has  begun  to  change,  and  important  recent
scholarship has offered granular analysis of animal ethics in contemporary Sri Lankan
Buddhism  (Stewart  2015)  and  in  early  Chinese  Buddhism  (Pu  Chengzhong  2014),
highlighting the degree to which individual Buddhist cultures can approach this question
quite differently. Within the study of Tibetan Buddhism in particular, there has also been
a recent increase in scholarly attention to the question of animals, as the articles in this
issue amply demonstrate. While there has certainly been scholarly attention paid to the
question  of  animal  ethics  in  Tibet,  however,  I  am unaware  of  previous  attempts  to
specifically look at Tibetan conceptions of the moral standing of animals4. By asking how
the Tibetan Buddhist tradition has viewed the moral standing of animals relative to that
of humans, this article seeks to offer a modest contribution to these larger discussions of
Buddhist approaches to animals and animal ethics.
 
A few definitions
3 The title of  this paper promises a look at the “moral standing of animals in Tibetan
Buddhism”. None of the terms used in this title are straightforward, however, so before
progressing  it  seems  prudent  to  discuss  them.  Most  significant  is  the  term  “moral
standing”,  (sometimes  referred  to  as  “moral  status”  or  “moral  considerability5”).
Speaking broadly, moral standing refers to whether or not a particular entity needs to be
considered when decisions are being made.  To what extend does a particular human
actor, in other words, need to consider the impact of their actions on another entity, be
that another human, an animal, a tree, or a rock. To give a somewhat trite example, most
people would agree that I should consider the impact of my actions on someone else
before I decide to punch them. On the other hand, many of those same people would
agree that I do not need to consider a rock’s feelings before kicking it. The human has
moral standing, while the rock does not.
4 In the context of animals, my use of this term refers to the degree to which animals are
understood to have moral claims on humans. Human beings interact with animals all the
time, and those interactions almost always come from a position where humans have
power over animals. If animals have high moral standing in a given society or cultural
context,  we might expect humans to take the animal’s perspective into consideration
when they wield that power. Conversely, if animals have little or no moral standing, we
might expect humans to disregard the animals’ own needs and do whatever they like for
any reason. My goal with this article, therefore, is to analyse Tibetan Buddhist attitudes
towards animals to try and discern to what degree humans should take animal needs and
perspectives into consideration when deciding on a course of action.
5 There are numerous reasons why an animal might have moral standing in a given society.
Here, I am primarily interested in what can be called “direct” moral standing. For an
animal to have direct moral standing, it needs to have moral standing for its own sake.
This is perhaps best understood by contrasting direct moral standing with “prudential”
moral standing, in which a human should treat an animal kindly, but only because that
kindness is good for the human6. To give a Buddhist example, a person who only refuses
to hurt animals because doing so will increase his or her own store of good karma is
granting the animal  prudential  moral  standing.  On the other hand,  a  human who is
On the moral standing of animals in Tibetan Buddhism
Études mongoles et sibériennes, centrasiatiques et tibétaines, 50 | 2019
2
genuinely concerned with the good of the animal itself grants the animal direct moral
standing. While some scholars have suggested that Buddhists only give animals moral
standing for prudential reasons, I will argue throughout this article that – at least in the
Tibetan tradition – Buddhism grants animals direct moral standing.
6 Before moving on, I also want to note that moral standing is a concept that, as far as I am
aware, does not exist within the Tibetan philosophical tradition. In this article, therefore,
I am trying to fit Tibetan ideas about animals into a foreign conceptual framework. It is
not surprising that this is a somewhat awkward fit at times, but I hope that the results are
useful nonetheless.
7 Following this discussion of moral standing, the next term to consider here is “animal”. In
formal usage, the English word animal refers to all members of the kingdom Animalia,
including humans,  other mammals,  insects,  fish,  and so on,  but excluding plants and
rocks. In order to emphasize that humans are also animals, some scholars have chosen to
use  the  term  “non-human  animal”  to  refer  to  non-human  animals.  While  I  am
sympathetic to the goals of this rhetorical move, however, I find this term awkward and
unwieldy,  particularly  when  the  term  appears  as  often  as  it  does  in  this  article.
Throughout this article, therefore, I will follow a more colloquial usage in which the term
animal refers only to non-human animals.
8 To my knowledge,  there is  no single Tibetan term that  perfectly corresponds to the
English  word  animal.  That  said,  there  are  several  common  Tibetan  terms  that  are
regularly used to refer broadly to non-human members of the animal kingdom. Perhaps
the most common is “düdro” (dud ’gro). Düdro literally means “one who goes bent over”,
thereby suggesting that animals are those who walk on all fours, in contradistinction to
humans’ bipedal movement. Given its emphasis on four-legged movement, this term is
sometimes used in a way that excludes non-quadruped animals such as birds (bya), fish (
nya), and insects (’bu srin). In practical usage, however, the term düdro often refers to all
non-human animals, and is, therefore, arguably the closest Tibetan term to the common
usage of the English word “animal”. Even more slippery are “sokchak” (srog chags) and “
semchen” (sems can). Sokchak literally means “one who has (or, perhaps, desires) life” and
semchen literally means “one who possesses a mind”. Strictly speaking, therefore, both
terms refer to all animals, including humans. Much like the English “animal”, however,
both terms are commonly used to refer to all sentient beings except humans. With the
exception of a discussion of “semchen”, this article will not dwell on the etymologies or
specific usages of these terms. It is worth noting at the outset, however, that Tibetan
terms for animals are at least as complex as their English counterparts.
9 Finally, a word on what I mean when I speak of “Tibetan Buddhism”. This article
approaches  the  Tibetan  Buddhist  tradition  as  if  it  were  a  monolithic  entity.  This  is
obviously  an  oversimplification.  There  are  a  wide  variety  of  religious  lineages  and
viewpoints  within  the  broader  Tibetan  tradition.  Further,  there  are  significant
differences in how Tibetans understood Buddhism, depending on what time period we are
talking about. Speaking of a single broad tradition, as I do in this article, is both deceptive
and  unfair  to  the  tradition  itself.  Given  the  limited  space  available,  however,  it  is
necessary in an article of this scope. Further, while the Tibetan tradition is quite diverse,
its approach to animals has remained remarkably (and perhaps surprisingly) consistent
over time. In this article I draw on sources from a variety of lineages and time periods
(though alert  readers  may notice  a  bias  towards  18th and  19 th century  authors  from
Eastern  Tibet),  and  the  views  that  they  present  are  quite  homogenous.  Given  this
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consistency and the need to keep this article to a manageable length, I have chosen to
speak of Tibetan Buddhism as if it were a unified tradition, despite the fact that this will,
inevitably, elide important differences within the tradition.
 
Alike
10 Classical  Buddhist  cosmologies  divide  the  world  into  six  (sometimes  five)  different
realms: that of gods, demi-gods, humans, animals, ghosts, and denizens of the various
hells. Each of these various realms is characterized by certain qualities and experiences.
Life as a god, for instance, is characterized in part by the enjoyment of pleasant food and
drink. Ghosts, on the other hand, are said to be unable to sate their hunger, and they
spend their lives continually seeking out food of any type. Importantly, however, no one
is bound forever to a particular form. When an individual born as a ghost eventually dies,
their consciousness will be re-born. This subsequent life could be as a ghost again, but it
could also be as a god, a human, or any other form of sentient life. Following that life, the
consciousness will again be re-born, in a never-ending cycle of birth, death, re-birth, and
re-death.  As  this  cycle  continues,  each  individual  consciousness  proceeds  through  a
myriad  of  different  forms  of  life.  While  any  given  consciousness  will  eventually
experience  life  in  each  of  the  different  realms,  the  birth  it  takes  on  any  particular
occasion is governed by its karma. That is, the actions, habits, and tendencies that an
individual carries with them at the moment of death are largely – if not quite exclusively
 –  responsible for the type of  birth they take in the next life.  Thus,  someone who is
overwhelmingly stingy in one life is likely to be born as a ghost in the next, where their
cravings will remain unsatisfied.
11 This six realm cosmology is found in numerous classical Indian Buddhist sources, and was
adopted by Tibetan thinkers soon after the introduction of Buddhism. Gampopa’s 12th
 century  Jewel  Ornament  of  Liberation,  to  give  one  early  example,  presents  a  detailed
account of this cosmology, including depictions of the various realms and the types of
karma required to be born in each. “Greed”, Gampopa informs us “has three types of
result. The ripened result is to be born as a hungry ghost. The corresponding result is that
even if you achieve a human birth, your mind will be based on greed. The dominant result
is  to  be  born in  a  place  with poor  quality  food” (Gampopa 1989,  pp. 94-957).  In  this
cosmological  vision,  particular  tendencies – in  this  example,  greed –  lead  to  birth  in
particular  realms.  Alternative  cosmologies  can  be  found  in  some  Tibetan  texts  and
traditions, but for the most part Tibetan Buddhists followed their Indian predecessors
and understood the world to be divided into six realms, with an individual’s placement
determined by their karma.
12 This cosmology carries with it a number of implications for how the relationship between
humans and animals is understood8. Most importantly, it suggests that while humans and
animals belong to distinct realms of existence, they are not fundamentally different types
of beings, and the boundary between their realms is not fixed or impassable. Given the
appropriate karma, someone currently born as a human can be re-born as an animal in
their  next  life,  and  vice  versa.  The  difference  between  humans  and  animals  is  not
inherent, but merely adventitious, reflecting the karma of that particular moment rather
than a core identity. In fact, given that the chain of births is essentially infinite, Buddhists
have concluded that not only could an individual be reborn as an animal,  they have
certainly lived as an animal many times in the past. Someone may be a human now, but
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that is a temporary situation. They were an animal in the past, and will be again at some
point in the future. The human/animal distinction is essentially fluid, depending on the
temporary situation rather than a fundamental identity. This understanding is reflected
in the fact that both humans and animals are included within the category of semchen (
sems can), “sentient beings”. Along with gods and ghosts, humans and animals are alike in
being sentient, capable of thought. It is the presence of a mind, in fact, that is the only
factor unifying beings across all six realms. Since they have a mind, humans, animals,
gods, and so on are all fundamentally the same type of being, akin to each other but
categorically distinct from insentient objects like plants and rocks9.
13 Since animals are sentient, they suffer in ways reminiscent of humans and other sentient
beings. Buddhism famously claims that life is suffused by suffering, and suggests that this
suffering can only be fully relieved by pursuing the Buddhist path. As the 18th century
teacher Jigmé Lingpa puts it in his Treasury of Precious Qualities, “Understand suffering in
this way: whether high or low, there is nowhere in all the six realms that is not subject to
pain, change, and the all-pervasive [suffering] of conditioned existence” (Jigmé Lingpa
1985a, p. 2010). Beings born in all six realms, in this view, are subject to the same three
basic forms of suffering. While all sentient beings suffer in these basic ways, however,
they  do  so  to  different  degrees  and  with  different  emphases.  And  animals  have  a
particularly heavy burden. The 20th century scholar Dungkar Losang Trinlé explains the
suffering experienced by domestic animals in his Doxography of Buddhist Systems, “Some
domestic animals, having been enslaved by people, are given burdens they cannot bear,
must plough [the fields], and are ridden, etc., whatever [their owners] desire they do.
Some animals are killed for the sake of their meat, skin, horns, etc. They have no control
over their lives” (Dungkar Losang Trinlé 2004, p. 20211). Nor is animal suffering limited to
domestic animals. Wild animals may live free and in the wild, but they live in constant
fear of each other. As Patrül Rinpoché explains in his famed Words of My Perfect Teacher,
“Deer and other wild animals that share our human world experience nothing but fear.
They cannot eat a mouthful of food without fear. They prey on each other, and then there
are hunters, carnivores and so many other killers. Hawks kill birds and birds kill bugs.
Nothing but  constantly  killing each other”  (Patrül  Rinpoché 2009,  p. 11512).  For  both
domestic and wild animals, life is characterized by physical and mental suffering.
14 This understanding of animal suffering is brought to life in a striking passage from The
Autobiography of Jigmé Lingpa. In this passage, Jigmé Lingpa is critiquing the slaughter of
animals for their meat, and uses the animal’s experience of the slaughter process as a
vivid argument against slaughter:
Having  now  become  animals,  your  fathers,  mothers,  siblings  and  friends  from
previous lives tremble with fear in the butcher’s sinful hands, tears streaming from
their eyes, and panting for breath. In that state they wonder what to do. Alas, there
is no refuge! There is nowhere to go! Thinking that, right now in this place, they
may be killed, their urgent suffering is great. In such a state, like one approaching a
terrifying pit of hell-fire, their body is turned upside down, their muzzle is tied up,
and their eyes move wildly with lights shining forth. What they see is their stomach
being opened up. With their feet perpendicular, they are set on the path to the next
life without even a quiver. (Jigmé Lingpa 1985b, pp. 125-12613)
15 Among other things, this passage makes clear that Jigmé Lingpa understands animals to
be highly self-aware. The animal he describes knows exactly what is happening to it, even
before the knife touches it. Jigmé Lingpa does not explain how it knows it is going to be
slaughtered, but something about the situation has caused it to fear its imminent death.
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Further, the animal is self-aware enough to be afraid of dying. The animal “wonders what
to do”, suggesting that it is seeking for a way to preserve its life. And the language Jigmé
Lingpa  uses  makes  clear  that  this  is  not  simply  some  kind  of  mindless,  instinctual
response. The animal is mentally processing and reflecting on what is happening to it,
rather than simply responding out of instinct.
16 A similar stance can be found in numerous short passages in Patrül Rinpoché’s Words of
My Perfect Teacher. In one instance, Patrül addresses the slaughter of lambs for their skins.
“As soon as a lamb is born”, he claims, “its senses are complete. It can feel comfort and
discomfort. But it is immediately killed, just as it first begins to enjoy life. It may be only a
stupid animal, but it is afraid of dying. It loves life, but experiences the pain of dying”
(Patrül Rinpoché 2009, p. 12114). In another passage, Patrül asks readers to “Think of an
individual animal, such as a sheep or a yak, that is about to be slaughtered. As it is taken
from  the  flock,  it  experiences  inconceivable  terror”  (ibid.,  pp. 314-31515).  Like Jigmé
Lingpa, Patrül makes clear that animals are self-aware and capable of understanding their
situation.  They  love  and  enjoy  their  lives,  are  afraid  of  death,  and  are  capable  of
understanding when death is at hand.
17 The assumption that animals are capable of thought and emotion is underscored by a
practice known as “giving the gift of fearlessness” (mi ’jigs pa spyin pa). In this practice, a
wealthy individual sets aside some land and declares that hunting (or otherwise harassing
animals) is forbidden16. Doing so saves animal lives, but it also does something more: it
gives the animals that live on this land the ability to live without fear of human hunters.
The practice of giving animals the gift of fearlessness reinforces the idea that animals are,
in fact,  capable of emotions such as fear.  It  also makes clear,  however,  that Tibetans
understood animals to be capable of differentiating between a situation in which fear is
appropriate and one in which it is not. Further, for this practice to have the intended
effect, the animals in question have to be capable of not only understanding that there is
no hunter at present, but also that there will be no hunter in the future. The Tibetans that
promoted and implemented this practice, therefore, must have viewed animals as both
emotionally  complex (capable  of  fear)  and capable  of  some level  of  rational  thought
(knowing when fear is appropriate and when it is not).
18 It  might  be possible  to  suggest  that  the state  of  fearlessness  is  merely  the result  of
conditioning,  meaning that  rather  than understanding the animals  to  be consciously
aware of the absence of hunters, these authors may simply think the animals gradually
become used to not needing to fear humans. But I have found no suggestion in Tibetan
literature that the animals are becoming conditioned in this way. Admittedly, texts that
mention the gift of fearlessness do not enumerate the exact mechanism fearlessness is
achieved. In his recent discussion of sealing, however, however, Carl Yamamoto points to
one early reference to the practice,  in which humans and animals are both included
within the purview of the seal. After assuming responsibility for the city of Lhasa and its
pilgrims, the 12th century figure Lama Zhang goes about the process of sealing the city
and its environs against both brigands and hunters. As a result, “In that place, laypeople,
innumerable merchants, fish, wild animals, birds, and so on, horses, and cows all had
peace and were cared for” (Lama Zhang 2004, pp. 542-54317). By seamlessly including both
humans and animals as the beneficiaries of his sealing practices, Lama Zhang suggests
that the fearlessness this practice provided worked the same way for both humans and
animals. I do not want to lay too much emphasis on this singular – and early – account,
and  it  is  entirely  possible  that  later  authors  understood  the  gift  of  fearlessness
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differently. But this vision of animal sentience – as able to respond to their environment
with some degree of rationality – accords with the patterns I have observed throughout
Tibetan texts, so it does not seem too far-fetched to imagine that many Tibetans assumed
that animals were able to recognize the absence of hunters and respond by abandoning
their fear of humans18.
19 Not only do these passages reflect an assumption that animals are intelligent and self-
aware, their mental state is also strikingly similar to what we might expect a human to
experience in similar circumstances. In particular, the types of suffering that they are
said to experience are types of suffering that would be familiar to any human. Animals
suffer from physical pain, as when they are beaten or forced to carry heavy loads. But
they also suffer mentally, as when they fear for their lives. This type of suffering – both
physical and mental – is similar to the suffering that human beings experience. This point
is brought home by another passage from Patrül’s Words of My Perfect Teacher, in which he
discusses the suffering experienced by a prisoner awaiting punishment. As with animals
awaiting slaughter, Patrül asks his readers to place themselves in the prisoner’s position:
“What to do? There is nowhere to run or hide, no refuge or protector. You cannot run
away and do not know how to fly. […] Now you must set out on the great path to the next
life.  How  terrifying!”  (Patrül  Rimpoché  2009,  p. 31119).  In Patrül’s  presentation,  the
suffering experienced by a prisoner awaiting execution closely parallels the suffering
experienced by animals awaiting slaughter. Both panic and look for an escape, a refuge.
When none is  found,  both the  prisoner  and the  animal  experience  deep fear  at  the
realization that they will soon die. Rather than claiming that animals experience life in
ways that humans cannot relate to, these depictions suggest that the division between
human and animal experience is not so great.
20 The division between human and animal becomes even more blurred when we consider
the common practice of intentionally viewing an animal as no different from one’s own
mother. This contemplative practice draws on the belief that all beings have lived an
infinite number of lives: at some point in the past, simple maths suggests that any two
beings have, in fact, been related as mother and child. In order to develop compassion
towards animals,  practitioners are sometimes asked to reflect  on this and to see the
animal in front of them as no different from their mother in this life, worthy of gratitude
and love. Gampopa gives a concise presentation of this practice:
Again, imagine if you own mother was before you, old and frail. Yet others enslaved
her, beat her, cut her, killed her, and cooked her. If this happened, would you not
feel compassion? It is certain that all beings now born as animals were once your
own  mother,  and  that  they  suffer  in  just  this  way.  How  can  you  not  feel
compassion?  Contemplate  this  and  aspire  for  them to  be  free  from suffering. (
Gampopa 1989, p. 12120)
21 By asking practitioners  to  explicitly  identify  the  animal  in  front  of  them with their
present mother, Gampopa emphasizes the similarity of human and animal experience.
Animal suffering, in this view, is fundamentally similar to human suffering, to the degree
that it can be understood by imagining a human in the animal’s position. Animal and
human suffering, it would seem, are not so different. Further, it is worth noting that the
practice Gampopa suggests is not at all unusual in Tibetan Buddhism. It is so widespread,
in fact, that it is often invoked without explanation, in the assumption that the audience
will understand what is being referred to. For instance, the eighth Karmapa, Mikyö Dorjé,
invokes this idea in the title of his anti-meat polemic, Letter on the Unsuitability of Eating the
Meat  of  Our  Past  Mothers,  apparently  with  the  assumption  that  his  readers  would
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immediately understand the idea that the animal they are eating was once their mother.
The ubiquity of this notion suggests that most, if not necessarily all, Tibetan Buddhist
thinkers were comfortable intentionally thinking of animals as their mothers, blurring
the lines that separate human from animal.
22 But these authors are not content to simply note the existence of animal suffering, they
also ask their followers to actively address it. Tibetan Buddhism self-consciously adheres
to  Mahāyāna  ethical  norms,  and  in  many  Tibetan  presentations  the  central  aim  of
Buddhist practice is to alleviating the suffering of all beings – human, animal, and other.
Jamgön Kongtrül explains this compassionate orientation, stating that one should “have
the superior intention, the fortitude to shoulder the great responsibility of the welfare of
all  sentient beings solely by oneself” (Jamgön Kongtrül 2009,  p. 10821).  One should,  in
other words, take on the responsibility of relieving the suffering of all others beings.
Attempting to do so,  for many Tibetans,  is foundational to the Buddhist path. In the
words of the Bön teacher Shardza Tashi Gyeltsen, “Compassion is the essence of all the
Buddha’s teachings” (Shardza Tashi Gyeltsen 2011, p. 14822).
23 When combined with the recognition that animals suffer, this call to compassion means
that  for  most  Tibetan Buddhist  thinkers,  humans  must  consider  the  impact  of  their
actions on animals. Patrül Rinpoché summarizes this position well:
Animals experience unimaginable suffering. Therefore, whenever you see animal
suffering, imagine that you are the animal and contemplate the suffering they are
experiencing. Meditate with fierce compassion for all those born as animals. More
specifically,  if  you have animals  of  your own,  care  for  them with kindness  and
compassion. There is not a single animal – not even the smallest insect – that does
not experience pleasure and pain. Further, there is not one that has not been our
mother or father. For these reasons, think of them all with love and compassion. (
Patrül Rinpoché 2009, pp. 116-11723)
24 For Patrül and many others, it is clear that animals have moral standing. When combined
with these same authors’ reflections on animals’ mental abilities, it becomes clear that
this moral standing is based on the animals’ sentience. Animals, as we have seen, have
rich emotional and mental lives, much like our own. In particular, animals – like humans –
have the ability to suffer. It is this sentience and ability to suffer that serves as the basis
for  their  moral  standing.  Importantly,  this  means  that  animals  have  direct  moral
standing, rather than prudential moral standing. Humans need to take animal needs into
consideration, in other words, because of the animals themselves, not simply because it is
good for humans to do so. Animals have moral standing from their own side, not from
ours.
25 Further, this moral standing is not simply theoretical: it is sufficient to justify concrete
action in the world. Tibetan biographical and narrative literature is replete with stories of
devout  Buddhists  practising  compassion  for  animals  by  reducing  their  suffering.  As
discussed previously, wealthy individuals sometimes sought to alleviate animal suffering
by purchasing land and banning hunting, giving animals the gift of fearlessness24. Jigmé
Lingpa, for instance, once bought an entire mountain in order to curtail the collection of
honey and the attendant harm this inflicted on bees (Jigmé Lingpa 1985b, pp. 208, 281,
393-395). Individuals also sometimes purchased animals destined for slaughter so that
they could be ransomed (tshe thar25). Sometimes this was done in huge numbers, as when
Khenpo Ngakchung’s disciples are said to have ransomed thirty-one thousand animals
(Khenpo  Ngakchung  2000,  p. 16426).  In  other  cases,  individuals  simply  responded  to
observed animal suffering by trying to alleviate it, as when Shabkar Tsokdrük Rangdröl
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spent  the  better  part  of  a  day  rescuing  insects  from a  grassfire  (Shabkar  Tsokdrük
Rangdröl  2003b,  pp. 84b-85a27).  These are  not  isolated or  unusual  actions,  but  rather
common practices attested in the literature of virtually all Buddhist lineages in Tibet.
Animals, it seems, carry enough moral standing to require humans to actually change
their behaviour, actively addressing animal suffering.
 
Yet not alike
26 The fact that animals enjoy this level of moral standing, however, does not mean that the
Buddhist intellectual tradition in Tibet sees humans and animals as morally equivalent.
Animals and humans are both sentient beings and both carry moral standing, but their
karma has  driven them to  be  born in  different  situations,  and these  differences  are
important. In particular, Tibetans (like other Buddhists) have long assumed that animals
are less intelligent than humans. Among other consequences, animals’ lack of intelligence
means that they are unable to practise religion28. “Animals are stupid”, the 20th century
lama Longchen Yeshé Dorjé explains, “so they do not know how to recite even a single
maṇi [mantra]”  (Longchen  Yeshe  Dorjé  1991,  p. 15 29)  Animals’  assumed  inability  to
practise religion can also be seen in a striking passage from Ra Yeshé Sengé’s Biography of
Ra Lotsawa, an eccentric 11th century teacher. This text describes numerous miracles Ra
Lotsawa performed, including one in which he does teach animals to practise religion:
Ra Lotsawa taught many dogs and mice to meditate, and did the same for those
sheep that belonged to local landowners. He taught about six hundred young male
and female sheep to meditate.  [….] Then a scholar named Geshé Yönten Drakpa
came forth to debate this point with him. The scholar said, “Meditation requires a
body with the freedoms and riches [i.e.: a human body]. Animals lack this freedom;
therefore it is impossible to teach them to meditate! Your claims are false!” The
great teacher Ra Lotsawa replied, “Generally, you are correct. Nevertheless, in some
particular cases it is not certain”. (Ra Yeshé Sengé 1989, pp. 117-11830)
27 We will return to this passage later, but for now it is sufficient to note that it is the
extraordinary nature of Ra Lotsawa’s claim that attracts the scholar’s scepticism. Echoing
normative  Buddhist  sentiment,  Geshé  Yönten  Drakpa  argues  that  animals  are  flatly
incapable of practising religion, so suggesting you have taught them to do so is nothing
short of a lie. Ra Lotsawa largely concurs, agreeing that under normal circumstances it is
impossible for animals to learn to meditate. His own miraculous ability to teach them
merely proves the general rule that animals are too stupid to practise religion.
28 Because animals cannot practise Buddhism, humans’ ability to alleviate their suffering is
limited. In Tibetan Buddhist perspectives,  suffering comes in many forms. It  includes
immediate physical  and mental  suffering,  but also includes more existential  forms of
suffering experienced by all sentient beings. This latter form of suffering can only be
alleviated through religious practice (particularly Buddhist practice). Since animals are
incapable  of  doing  so,  they  are  unable  to  make  progress  towards  resolving  such
existential suffering. Unless one has Ra Lotsawa’s miraculous skill, therefore, a human’s
ability to alleviate animal suffering is limited. One can relieve the temporary physical
pain an animal  experiences,  or even mental  sufferings such as fear.  But without the
ability to teach an animal Buddhist practices, one cannot bring about the permanent end
to suffering that characterizes enlightenment.
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29 Further, Tibetan texts almost always claim that the types of suffering described above are
inherent  when a being is  born as  an animal.  Being born as  an animal  is  seen as  an
“unfortunate birth” (ngan ’gro),  the result  of  previous negative karma.  And once that
karma results in taking birth as an animal, the attendant forms of suffering (stupidity,
fear, and so on) are inescapable. In this regard, it is worth emphasizing the matter-of-fact
tone  employed  when  describing  animal  suffering.  Neither  Dungkar  Losang  Trinlé  or
Patrül  Rinpoché  gives  any  suggestion  that  their  depiction  of  animal  suffering  is
conditional. Instead, they are simply presenting the facts of the case: life as an animal is,
by definition, characterized by suffering in these particular ways. A similarly matter-of-
fact tone can be found in many other descriptions of animal suffering as well. For these
Tibetans, such suffering was simply an unavoidable part of life as an animal.
30 This emphasis on animals’ stupidity and the unavoidability of animal suffering means
that, generally speaking, animals’ moral standing is lower than that of humans. Humans
have  the  ability  to  make  progress  towards  the  permanent  elimination  of  suffering.
Further, they have the ability to use religious practice to increase their ability to help
alleviate the suffering of others. These factors make a human life particularly valuable.
More valuable, in fact, than an animal’s. Shabkar Tsokdrük Rangdröl makes this clear in
his Nectar of  Immortality.  In this text,  Shabkar is a strong advocate for vegetarianism,
pointing out repeatedly and insistently that eating meat causes animals to be killed. Meat
eating, he makes clear, is the immediate cause of significant animal suffering. And yet
there are circumstances when eating meat is allowed:
When is meat permitted? … [It is allowed] if one is going on a long journey, such as
from [the northeastern region of] Amdo to Central Tibet,  and can find no other
food.  If  you  do  not  eat  meat,  your  life  will  be  in  danger.  Similarly,  if  one  is
weakened by illness and on the verge of death, so that not eating meat would cause
them to die. If a great Bodhisattva who dwells on the grounds of liberation were to
die, the torch of the teachings would be extinguished, while if they lived a long time
it  would be very beneficial  for the teachings and beings.  Therefore,  when some
great teachers reach old age and need to support their body’s wind humour, they
are allowed to eat meat. (Shabkar Tsokdrük Rangdröl 2003, pp. 609-61031)
31 Even for Shabkar, among the most adamant vegetarians in Tibetan history, the need to
preserve human life outweighs the harm that eating meat inflicts on animals. Further, as
Shabkar’s emphasis on preserving the lives of great masters suggests, human superiority
is intimately related to the ability to practise religion. Humans in general may take the
lives of animals in order to save their own. But this is especially true in the case of high
lamas, whose ability to teach means that they can alleviate suffering on a real, long-term
level.  In this regard, Shabkar is typical of the Tibetan tradition more broadly. For all
Tibetans  that  I  am aware  of,  human life  clearly  outweighs  animal  life.  Humans  can
practise Buddhism, and thereby bring a lasting end to their own and others’ suffering.
Animals are unable to do so, and so will remain trapped in the ongoing cycle of birth and
death. Given the choice between saving a human life and an animal’s, therefore, Tibetan
thinkers  consistently  side  with  the  human.  This  is  true  not  only  of  mainstream
intellectuals,  but even those such as Shabkar who are otherwise exceptionally strong
advocates of practising compassion towards animals.
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Blurred lines
32 While the Tibetan tradition as a whole insists that human moral standing is superior to
animals’, some authors suggest that their superiority may be minimal. We have already
seen some examples suggestive of this,  but the slippery nature of the human/animal
distinction is brought home more fully in those few passages that suggest that animals are
capable of thinking and acting with some level  of  ethical  thought,  and perhaps even
capable of practising religion. As just discussed, most Buddhist thinkers – both in Tibet
and elsewhere – have argued that animals are too stupid for ethical or religious conduct.
But in at  least  a  few places,  Tibetan narrative literature suggests  that  there is  some
flexibility here, and that animals might be able to appreciate the dharma.
33 It is fairly common, for instance, for Tibetan autobiographies to claim that a particular
teacher was able to pacify wild animals by teaching the dharma. Perhaps the most famous
example of this can be found in Tsangnyon Heruka’s Collected Songs of Milarepa,  a 12th
 century hermit who is among the most famous religious figures in Tibetan history. In one
well-known episode, Milarepa is meditating in a forest when a frightened deer runs in
front of him. Milarepa sings a dharma song, calming the deer down. Moments later, a
large, angry hunting dog appears. Again, Milarepa calms it with the dharma. Finally, a
hunter – the dog’s owner – appears. He is livid that his dog and his quarry are both sitting
calmly in front of Milarepa. Once again, Milarepa calms the hunter with a dharma song.
This  song is  so  effective,  in  fact,  that  the hunter renounces  hunting and becomes a
dedicated disciple (Tsangnyon Heruka 1999, pp. 430-44132). This passage makes clear that
animals are able to respond positively when they are presented with the dharma, at least
in Tsangnyon Heruka’s estimation. Further, the story’s parallel structure highlights the
similarities between the way the dog, deer, and human responded to Milarepa’s songs.
Either the animals in this story are almost human, or the human is almost animal.
34 That the latter is even a possibility is brought home by a short passage in the late 19th
 century teacher Jamgön Mipham’s treatise on good governance, Guidance for Kings. In the
verse opening of this work, Mipham praises the value of scriptural learning, concluding
that, “those who are given scriptures that increase wisdom, but do not make use of them
really are animals, aren’t they?” (Jamgön Mipham 1984, p. 733) Mipham’s intention here is
to praise scriptural study, not to discuss the relative intelligence of animals. At the same
time, however, this line can be read to suggest that there can be some slippage between
human and animal identity. Pointedly, Mipham claims that a human who fails to make
use of religious resources is an animal (phyugs min nam), rather than is like an animal. By
doing so he raises the possibility that the true difference between humans and animals is
not a particular type of  body,  but rather a question of  intelligence.  Humans,  on this
reading, are only human if they actually make use of their intelligence. Again, the line
between human and animal becomes obscured.
35 While the animals in the Milarepa story clearly respond to and appreciate the dharma,
however, there is no suggestion that they become disciples or actively practise religion in
the way that the hunter does. This story and the many others like it can be read as simply
suggesting that animals can be calmed or pacified by the dharma, rather than asserting
that they are capable of actual religious practice. A few stories, however, question even
this  seemingly firm boundary between human and animal.  To illustrate this,  we can
return to the passage from Ra Yeshé Sengé’s Biography of Ra Lotsawa quoted previously. In
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this passage, we may recall that Ra Lotsawa claims to have taught numerous dogs, mice,
and sheep to meditate. His claim is met by scepticism on the part of a scholar, who points
out that animals are incapable of religious practice. Ra Lotsawa admits the Geshé is right,
but only up to a point: “Generally, you are correct. Nevertheless, in some particular cases
it is not certain” (Ra Yeshé Sengé 1989, pp. 117-11834). This passage confirms that animals
are generally incapable of meditating or otherwise practising religion. At the same time,
however,  it  also  suggests  that  this  might  not  be  the  animals’  fault.  The  animals  in
question were presumably normal animals, and yet Ra Lotsawa was able to teach them.
The key factor, in this particular story, is not the animals’ own capacity, but the presence
or absence of a sufficiently skilled teacher. This is just a short passage, one miracle among
many in the biography of Ra Lotsawa. It should not, therefore, be understood to represent
the Tibetan Buddhist tradition as a whole, or even a clear statement of this author’s own
understanding.  It  does,  however,  hold  out  the  possibility  that  some  Tibetans  were
comfortable with the idea that,  given the right  conditions,  animals  might be able to
practise religion after all.
36 It is worth emphasizing that the animals discussed in this and similar passages are not
metaphorical, such as those found in Aesop’s Fables, or in some Buddhist Jataka literature
35. Such literary representations of animals are common in Tibetan literature. But in the
passages cited here, the authors are seeking to give naturalistic descriptions of actual
animals. As such, these passages represent their author’s understanding of how animal
minds work, and in almost all cases those animal minds are understood to be rich in both
thought  and  emotion.  Further,  these  animal  minds  are  presented  in  ways  strikingly
similar to human minds. This does not mean that they are fully equivalent, of course. We
may recall that Patrül describes lambs as “only stupid animals” (Patrül Rimpoché 2009,
p. 12136), and Ra Yeshé Sengé never disputes that under most circumstances, animals are
incapable  of  practising  Buddhism.  Nevertheless,  the  overall  tenor  of  these  passages
suggests that animals experience and process their world in ways that would be familiar
to a human.
37 Overall,  it  is  clear  that  in  the  view  of  most  Tibetan  intellectuals,  animals  carried
significant moral standing. This moral standing does not rise to the level enjoyed by
humans, largely because only humans are able to practise religion, and so only humans
are able to address the root causes of suffering. Nevertheless, despite this insistence that
animals  are  below  humans,  these  authors  also  suggest  that  the  gap  between  these
categories  is  minimal.  Animals  experience  the  world,  we  are  told,  in  ways  that  are
fundamentally similar to human experience. Further, these authors repeatedly encourage
their readers to self-consciously view animals as similar to their mothers,  and to act
accordingly. Even though this may not mean that animals are truly morally equivalent to
humans, it suggests that humans should act as if they are. Even though animals are lower
than humans, therefore, they nevertheless retain a high level of moral standing, and it is
incumbent upon humans to consider the impact of their actions on animal experience.
The  contemporary  Central  Tibetan  teacher  Rasé  Könchok  Gyatso  summarizes  this
attitude well: “Among the beings in this world, it is very hard to find one that does not
cherish life, that does not avoid hurting itself, or that is not afraid. All beings are the
same in cherishing life and being aware of happiness and suffering. […] So do not separate
animals as ‘other,’ but always treat them with equality. This is why [the Buddha] teaches
that it is inappropriate to harm any being that experiences itself as alive and embodied,
even an insect” (Rasé Könchok Gyatso 2004, p. 1037).
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 Some contrasts
38 Across  the  board,  then,  Tibetan Buddhist  literature consistently  presents  a  vision in
which animals enjoy significant moral standing. This conclusion is interesting in its own
right, but it is also striking because it differs dramatically from the perspective taken in
some of the most influential studies of Buddhism and animals to date. In their analysis of
Buddhist animal ethics, some scholars have concluded that while Buddhism does grant
animals  some degree of  moral  standing,  it  is  minimal  when compared with humans.
Humans, in this vision, should not actively persecute animals, but also do not need to
actively seek to alleviate their suffering. In the most influential such assessment, Paul
Waldau argues in The Specter  of  Speciesism.  Buddhist  and Christian Views of  Animals that
Buddhism’s insistence that animals are inferior to humans outweighs any sense of kinship
between animals and humans due to their shared status as sentient beings. This tendency
is so strong, Waldau believes, that Buddhism is “speciesist”, by which he means, “the
inclusion of all human animals within, and the exclusion of all non-human animals from,
the moral circle” (Waldau 2001, p. 38). Even when the textual tradition explicitly endorses
an ideal of non-harm towards animals, Waldau asserts,  this is only provisional:  “some
level of concern can be accorded to other animals when their interests are not in conflict
with the interests of  humans” (ibid.,  p. 152).  Even when animals seem to have moral
standing,  in  other  words,  this  applies  only  when  it  is  convenient.  In  Waldau’s
interpretation, Buddhism’s dim view of animal sentience means that they are entirely, or
almost entirely, beyond the moral sphere, and humans have few ethical responsibilities
towards them. Buddhism grants animals little, if any, moral standing.
39 Not all  scholars  share such a negative interpretation of  Buddhism’s  attitude towards
animals.  There  is  not  space  here  for  a  full  summary of  all  points  made in  the  rich
literature on Buddhism and animal  ethics,  but  it  is worth mentioning several  recent
works have explicitly pushed back against Waldau. Drawing on the idea that humans and
animals share an essential status as sentient beings, for instance, Norm Phelps argues
passionately that, “Buddhism recognizes no essential distinction between humans and
animals. There is no line that can be drawn between us, no Great Divide” (Phelps 2004,
p. 33). Phelps’s arguments here have been picked up by other scholars sympathetic to the
plight of animals, notably Lisa Kemmerer, whose Animals and World Religions – one of very
few  textbooks  on  the  topic  of  religion  and  animals –  quotes  Phelps  extensively  and
approvingly (Kemmerer 2011, pp. 91-126).  For her part,  Bronwyn Finnigan has argued
specifically against Waldau’s claims that Buddhism is speciesist, “If speciesism is the view
that only members of the human species have moral significance, however, then it does
not follow from the above considerations. Animals are included within the scope of the
first precept and so have moral significance in Buddhism” (Finnigan 2017, p. 3). James
Stewart also argues specifically against Waldau’s speciesism claim, suggesting that while
some of Waldau’s points are well made, they do not amount to a claim of speciesism,
unless that term is re-defined to mean anything less than a strict moral equivalence
between humans and animals (Stewart 2014, pp. 644-645).
40 Despite these critical voices, however, Waldau’s position remains broadly influential38. His
emphasis  on  placing  animals’  moral  standing  far  below  humans’,  however,  diverges
strongly from what I see in the Tibetan tradition. As in Waldau’s analysis of South Asia
texts, the Tibetan works I examine display a tension between a vision of animals as co-
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sentient beings and one that portrays them as stupid and incapable of religious practice.
While Waldau suggests that Buddhism tends to reify the difference between humans and
animals, however, I see an emphasis on blurring that distinction. It is beyond the scope of
this  paper to engage in  a  full  critical  analysis  of  Waldau’s  position39.  It  is  my hope,
however, that this paper will serve – alongside the work of Phelps, Stewart, Finnigan and
others – to demonstrate that not all Buddhist thinkers in all cultural contexts held such a
dim view of the moral standing of animals40.
 
Conclusion
41 Over the course of this article, I have discussed Tibetan Buddhist perspectives on the
moral standing of animals. The Tibetan authors I have cited and discussed are invariably
elite religious scholars. They were well versed in religious literature, and their opinions
draw on normative Buddhist concepts.  It  is worth noting,  therefore,  that the general
picture of animal moral standing that I have outlined in this article accords well with the
way that non-elite Tibetans interacted with their animals. As Nancy Levine’s article in
this present volume illustrates well, many Tibetan nomads have a complex, multifaceted
relationship with their animals (Levine, this volume). They depended on the products of
their  yaks  and  sheep  for  survival,  but  also  saw  their  animals  as  individuals  with
personalities and rich emotional lives. My own, admittedly limited, experience with
Tibetan nomads suggests that they very much see their animals as sentient creatures with
significant moral standing, to the extent that harming them should only be undertaken
when necessary. This impression aligns well with Gillian Tan’s recent analysis, wherein
she  suggests  that  the  nomads  she  worked with  saw a  kinship  between humans  and
animals that did not exist  between humans and trees,  rocks,  or other aspects of  the
natural world (Tan 2016, p. 941). A full analysis of nomadic attitudes towards the moral
standing of animals is beyond the scope of this article, but an initial look suggests that it
may not differ dramatically from the elite, religious perspective discussed here.
42 Like other forms of Buddhism, the Tibetan tradition is diverse, with a variety of distinct
practices and points of view. Among other things, this means that some individuals and
lineages have a more expansive view of animal ethics than others. Some bring up the
plight of animals consistently, repeatedly asking their audience to respect and be kind to
them. For others, animals are mentioned only as an afterthought, if at all. Nevertheless,
despite these differences, most Tibetan thinkers agree on the basic point that animal
suffering matters, and that humans should take that suffering into account when acting
in the world. They agree, in other words, that animals have moral standing. Further,
there  is  broad agreement  within the  tradition on the  basis  for  that  moral  standing.
Animals are sentient beings, just as humans are. As such, they have rich mental lives,
thinking, feeling, and suffering in ways that would be familiar to any human. Animals
were assumed to be less intelligent than humans, and incapable of religious practice.
Human needs, therefore, did outweigh animal needs. While the moral standing of animals
did not rise to the level of humans’, however, this does not mean it was inconsequential.
A  variety  of  common  practices  reinforced  the  idea  that  while  animals  were  below
humans,  they  nevertheless  mattered  a  great  deal.  Despite  their  limited  intelligence,
therefore,  it  is  clear  that  in  the  Tibetan tradition animals  enjoyed significant  moral
standing.
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program, Otterbein University, and Oregon State University for the financial support
necessary to undertake the research behind this paper. I am also indebted to the two
reviewers whose comments have greatly improved this paper, as well as the many
colleagues who have suffered through my presentations on this topic with enough
patience and kindness to offer feedback.
2. There have been far too many studies of Buddhist approaches to animal ethics to list
here, but some important recent contributions include: Finnigan 2017, Harvey 1989,
Ohnuma 2017, Stewart 2017, Waldau 2001.
3. For a concise discussion of the latter, see Steiner 2006.
4. On Tibetan animal ethics in general, see Ga Errang 2016, Gayley 2017.
5. For a good introduction to this topic, see Gruen 2014.
6. For a good discussion of these different types of moral standing in the context of the
Hindu epic Mahābahārata, see Framarin 2014, pp. 112-128.
7. Throughout this article, all English translations from Tibetan sources are my own, with
the original Tibetan given in a footnote. When an alternate translation has been
published (as with this source), I will note that fact in the footnote. Page numbers
provided in parentheses always refer to the original Tibetan text.
de’i ’bras bu la yangs gsum las/ rnam par smin pa’i ’bras bu ni/ yi dwags su skye bar ’gyur ro/
rgyu mthun gyi ’bras by ni/ gal te mir skyes na yang ’dod chags shas che bar 'gyur ro/ dbang gi
'bras by ni/ yul ’bru ngan pa'i sar skye bar ’gyur ro/
For an alternative translation, see Gampopa 2017, p. 81.
8. The implications of the continuity between the human and animal realms has been
widely discussed in the literature on Buddhism and animal ethics. For a critical discussion
of this point, see Waldau 2001, pp. 137-141.
9. One interesting point of potential controversy involves the question of microscopic
creatures such as bacteria. I have heard some contemporary Tibetans explain that
bacteria are included within the semchen sphere, while others explain that they are better
understood as plants. As interesting as it is, however, a detailed discussion of this
distinction is beyond the scope of this paper.
10. de la sdug bsngal shes par bya ba ni/ /gnas rigs drug po dma’ ‘am mtho yang rung/ /sdug
bsngal ‘gyur dang khyab pa ‘du byed kyis/ /dam la ma bzhang ‘khor ba yod ma yin/
For an alternative translation, see Jigme Lingpa et al. 2010, p. 32.
11. bkol zhing spyod pa'i sdug bsngal/ mi dang lhan du gnas pa'i dud 'gro'i nang nas khag cig mis
bran du bkol nas mi theg pa'i khal 'gel ba dang/ rmon pa rgyag pa/ steng du bzhon pa sogs gang
'dod byed pa dang/ dud 'gro khag cig sha dang pags pa/ rwa co sogs kyi don du bsad de srog la
rang dbang med pa/
12. mi yul gyi dud 'gro mis bdag tu ma bzung ba'i ri dwags la sogs pa rnams ni 'jigs skrag gi snang
ba kho na la spyod/ zas kham gang za yang bag mi pheb bzhin du za/ gcig gis gcig la za zhing/
rngon pa dang gcan gzan la sogs bsod pa po grangs mang/ khras bye'u dang bye'us 'bu gsod pas
mtshon/ gcig gis gcig gsod pa'i las ngan pa kho na rtag tu gsog/
For an alternative translation, see Patrul Rinpoche 1998, p. 76.
13. sdig can shan pa zer bde'i lag tu rang gi skye ba sngon ma'i pha dang/ ma dang/ spun zla
gnyen bshes la sogs pa de dag mthar chags su rtsis sprod byas ba'i tshe/ ma rgan de dag lus 'dar
phri li li/ mig mchi ma khram khram/ dbugs spud pa lhed lhed pa'i ngang nas 'di snyam du/ da ci
drag kyi hud/ 'bros sa ni med/ 'phur ni mi thug/ da lta nyid du sa 'dir dim na dim na snyam pa'i
sdug bsngal dos drag la lcid che/ 'jigs skrag gi snang ba dmyal me'i dong khar lhags pa lta bu'i
ngang der/ lus gnam sa bsgyur/ brang dred tsha lam lam byed cing mig spo hur hur/ lta bzhin pa
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de'i lto ba gris kha phye/ lag pa shad de btang nas 'gul ba tsam yang med par 'jig rten phyi ma'i
lam por btang ba yin 'dug pas/
14. skyes pa de dbang po thams cad rdzogs/ bde sdug gi tshor ba dang ldan/ lus kyang nyams
brtas/ gson pa'i dang po skyid par yod pa'i dus su 'phral du bsad pa yin/ rmongs pa dud 'gro yin
yang 'chi ba la ni 'tsher/ gson pa la ni dga'/ gnad gcod kyi sdug bsngal ni myong/
For an alternative translation, see Patrul Rinpoche 1998, p. 80.
15. khyad par bsha' lug sogs gsod pa'i skabs/ dang po mang po'i khyu nas bzung ba'i tshe/ de la
'jigs skrag gi snang ba bsam gyis mi khyab pa yod pas/ […] za phod pa 'di las kyi srin po dngos so
'dug/
For an alternative translation, see Patrul Rinpoche 1998, p. 203.
16. It is worth noting that in some early formulations, the gift of fearlessness meant
protecting animals (and humans) from carnivorous animals. In later formulations, this
became standardized so that this gift meant to protect all animals from human predation.
For more on this practice, and the related practice of “sealing the hills”, see Huber 2003,
pp. 40-41.
17. de yi yul na ser chags dang/ tshong pa dpag tu med pa dang/ nya dang ri dwags bya la sogs/
rta phyugs mang po bde zhing ’tsho/
For an alternative translation, see Yamamoto 2014, p. 198.
18. It may be worth noting that this practice was often effective in making wild animals
behave without a fear of humans. For the account of one western explorer startled to find
animals living without fear under the protection of a monastery, see Macdonald 1973, p. 
226.
19. da ci byed bros sa dang gab sa/ skyabs dang skyong pa ni med/ 'bros ni mi nus/ 'phur ni mi
shes/ … tshe phyi ma'i lam po cher 'gro dgos pa 'di ya re nga
For an alternative translation, see Patrul Rinpoche 1998, pp. 201-202.
20. yang bdag gi ma de sa phyogs 'di na rgas shing dman pa'am/ gzhan dag gis dbang med par
bkol zhing spyad pa'am/ brdeg cing 'tshog pa'am/ bsad cing bcad pa la sogs pa byed cing 'dug na
snying rje'o/ /de bzhin du dud 'gror skyes pa'i sems can thams cad kyang bdag gi ma yin nges na/
sdug bsngal de lta bus ni nyams thag na/ ci ste snying mi rje ste/ de rnams sdug bsngal dang bral
bar 'dod pa'i snying rje bsgom mo/
For an alternate translation, see Gampopa 2017, p. 95.
21. sems can ma lus pa'i don gyi khur chen rang nyid kho nas khyer ba'i lhag bsam gyi snying
stobs dang ldan pa/
For an alternative translation, see Padmasambhava & Jamgön Kongtrül 1999, p. 117.
22. sangs rgyas bstan pa’i nyams len thams cad mdor hril gyis dril na rtag tu tshad med snying rje
chen po
For a complete translation of this text, see Barstow 2017.
23. de lta bu sdug bsngal bsam gyis mi khyab pa la spyod pa yin pas/ de ltar sdug bsngal ba'i sems
can mthong tsa na de rang nyid yin pa'i blo bzhag nas sdug bsngal ci tsam 'dug la sogs pa zhib tu
bsam nas/ dud 'gro'i gnas su skyes pa spyi la snying rje drag po bsgom zhing khyad par rang la
bsten pa'i dud 'gro sogs yod na byams brtses skyong ba dang/ tha na 'bus sbrang dang srog chags
phra mo tshun chad la'ang bde sdug gi tshor ba med pa ni gcig kyang med la/ de thams cad kyang
rang gi pha ma ma byas pa’ang med pas teams cad la beams pa dang saying roe bsgom pa
For an alternative translation, see Patrul Rinpoche 1998, p. 77.
24. For more on the practice of sealing hills against hunters, see Huber 2003.
25. For a fuller discussion of this practice, see Holler 2002, and Tan 2016.
26. For the same passage in English, see Khenpo Ngawang Palzang 2014, pp. 169-170.
27. For an alternative translation, see Shabkar Tsokdruk Rangdrol 2001, p. 103.
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28. For a particularly nuanced discussion of animal’s inability to practise religion because
of their stupidity in the context of Sri Lankan Buddhism, see James Stewart’s recent
article “Dharma Dogs” (Stewart 2017). Stewart reports that, as in the Tibetan tradition,
contemporary Sri Lankan Buddhists assume that while animals may acquire some
measure of positive karma through association with Buddhist cites, personages and texts,
their lack of intelligence means that they are incapable of focused Buddhist practice.
29. blun pas ma ṇi rdog cig 'don mi shes pa
For an alternative translation, see Jigmé Lingpa & Longchen Yeshe Dorje 2010, p. 118.
30. khyi dang byi la mang por yang sgom btab/ gnas po tshang gi lug khyu la'ang de ltar mdzad
pas/ lug ma bu drug brgya tsam la sgom thebs pas [...] de'i tshe dge bshes yon tan grags pa bya ba
gcig rtsod pa byed du byung ste/ bsgom btab pa la dal 'byor gyi lus rten thob pa dgos/ dud 'gro mi
khom pa'i gnas yin pas sgom thebs mi srid/ khyod kyi de rdzun yin zer ba la/ bla ma rwa chen gyi
zhal nas/ spyir btang la de ltar yin kyang khyad par la nges pa med/
For an alternative translation, see Ra Yeshé Sengé 2015, p. 108.
31. de la gnang tshul ni/ so thar skabs su/ yul mdo smad nas dbus gtsang lta bu'i thag ring re
phyin tshe lam nas za rgyu ma rnyed/ ma zos na srog gi bar chad du 'grol dus dang/ nad pa zungs
zad 'chi la nye ba sha zhig ma zos na mi 'tsho bar thag chod pa'i dus dang/ byang sems skabs su sar
gnas kyi byang chub sems dpa' chen po gshegs na bstan pa'i sgron me nub/sku tshe yun ring 'tsho
na bstan 'gro'i don rlabs chen 'ong ba'i bla ma skyes chen 'ga' res skun bgres dus rlung bcos 'dra
byed dgos pa'i dus dang/
For an alternative translation, see Shabkar 2004, p. 121.
32. For a complete translation of this story, see Tsangnyön Heruka 2017, pp. 285-298.
33. cho don ‘dod dang thar pa yi/ /’byung gnas chen po rig pa yin/ /rig pa spel ba’i gzhung bzang
po/ /byin kyang mi mkho phyugs min nam
For an alternative translation, see Jamgon Jamgön Mipham 2017, p. 12.
34. spyir btang la de ltar yin kyang khyad par la nges pa med/
For an alternative translation, see Ra Yeshé Sengé 2015, p. 108.
35. For an excellent analysis of the literary role of animals in the Jataka stories in their
Indian Buddhist context, see Ohnuma 2017, pp.  41-94.
36. rmongs pa dud 'gro yin yang
For an alternative translation, see Patrul Rinpoche 1998, p. 80.
37. 'jig rten thog sems can su 'dra zhig yin rung rang gi srog la ma gces pa dang 'chi ba la mi 'tsher
zhing mi skrag pa ni shin tu dkon la/ 'gro ba thams cad srog dang bcas pa dang/ bde sdug gi tshor
ba yod pa gcig mtshungs yin pa'i phyir/rang ci 'dra ba gzhan kun kyang de 'dra yin stabs/ der
brten sangs rgyas kyi thugs brtse ba chen pos ni nye ring med par kun la snyoms pas mi zhes tshur
mi gcod/ dud 'gro zhes phar mi gcod par rtag tu 'dra mnyam gnang zhing/ srog chags phra mo
tshun chad srog dang bcas pa'i lus can kun la rang gi nyams la gzhigs nas gnod pa byed mi rung
bar gdams te/
38. Reiko Ohnuma’s recent Unfortunate Destiny, for instance, draws heavily and largely
positively on Waldau’s analysis. While Ohnuma does state that “some aspects of Waldau’s
claim of Buddhist speciesism are perhaps overstated” (Ohnuma 2017, p. 16), she is also
insistent that, “Despite the much-vaunted continuity and fluidity of the karmic hierarchy
(such that human beings can be re-born as animals, and animals as human beings), there
is nevertheless a strong concern with keeping the basic categories of rebirth – the five or
six gatis [realms of re-birth] – distinct from each other and in proper hierarchical order” (
ibid., pp. 16-17).
39. It is worth noting that while Waldau explicitly claims to speak for Buddhism in
general (Waldau 2001, p. 153), his analysis is based almost exclusively on Pali language
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sources, largely ignoring the vast collection of primary source material in Sanskrit, let
alone Tibetan, Chinese, or other Buddhist languages. Waldau is not the first scholar to
assume that the Pali canon somehow speaks for the Buddhist tradition as a whole. There
is no doubt that the Pali texts preserve ancient Buddhist teachings, but this antiquity
does not grant them authoritative status for all Buddhists. Most Mahāyāna Buddhists
(indeed, arguably most Buddhists in general) consider these texts to be of only
provisional rather than definitive meaning. It is, therefore, deeply problematic to draw
conclusions about the Buddhist tradition as a whole based exclusively or almost
exclusively, on Pali texts.
40. For yet another different Buddhist take on animals, see Pu Chengzhong’s excellent,
but often overlooked, monograph on early Chinese Buddhist perspectives on animals: Pu
Chengzhong 2014.
41. Tan’s analysis points to the presence of la (bla) – which she translates somewhat
problematically as “soul” – as the key factor differentiating humans and animals on the
one side from other aspects of the natural world on the other. These nomads, therefore,
frame the kinship between humans and animals using different terms than the elite
religious scholars I have analysed here. The implications of this different language are
intriguing and deserve further study, but for the present it is sufficient to note that the
result is similar: humans and animals are akin to each other, and distinct from rocks,
trees, and so on.
ABSTRACTS
Like other Buddhist traditions, Tibetan Buddhism recognizes that because animals are sentient
beings they have some level of moral standing, meaning that humans should take animal needs
and concerns  into  account  when deciding what  to  do in  any given situation.  In  this  article,
therefore, I do not seek to determine whether animals have moral standing at all, but rather
whether this moral standing is minimal (meaning that animal concerns are far below human
concerns)  or  maximal  (animals  and  humans  are  equally  important).  Through  an  analysis  of
Tibetan Buddhist  textual  sources,  I  argue that  while  this  tradition does place humans above
animals, it nonetheless grants animals a relatively high degree of moral status, and as such the
impact of human actions on animals needs to be taken seriously.
Comme les autres traditions bouddhiques, le bouddhisme tibétain reconnaît que, parce que les
animaux sont des êtres sensibles, ils ont un certain sens moral, ce qui signifie que les humains
doivent tenir compte de leurs besoins et de leurs préoccupations pour décider de ce qu’il faut
faire dans une situation donnée. Dans cet article, je ne cherche pas à déterminer si les animaux
ont  un  sens  moral,  mais  plutôt  si  ce  sens  moral  est  minimal  (ce  qui  signifie  que  les
préoccupations  des  animaux  sont  bien  en-deçà  des  préoccupations  humaines)  ou  maximal
(animaux et humains ont une égale importance). À travers une analyse des sources textuelles
bouddhiques  tibétaines,  je  soutiens  que  si  cette  tradition  place  les  humains  au-dessus  des
animaux,  elle  confère  néanmoins  à  ces  derniers  un  statut  moral  relativement  élevé  et,  par
conséquent, l'impact des actions humaines sur les animaux doit être pris au sérieux.
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